Zyxel's June Fix Never Stopped the GS1900 Exploit — Patch 3 Finally Closes the Pre-Auth Root Hole, CVE-2026-107441

Zyxel's June Fix Never Stopped the GS1900 Exploit — Patch 3 Finally Closes the Pre-Auth Root Hole, CVE-2026-107441

Zyxel's June Fix Never Stopped the GS1900 Exploit — Patch 3 Finally Closes the Pre-Auth Root Hole, CVE-2026-107441

When GreyNoise reported in September that attackers had drained data from 996 Zyxel GS1900 switches across 48 countries, everyone blamed CVE-2026-7273 — a flaw Zyxel had already patched in June. That was wrong, researchers at Binarly now say. The exploit the attackers used kept working on fully patched switches, because the June fix addressed only half the bug. Zyxel has now shipped Patch 3 firmware for ten GS1900 models, closing the real vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-107441 — an out-of-bounds write in the switch's web management CGI program that lets an unauthenticated attacker run OS commands with root privileges.

The technical story explains the patch gap. The vulnerable CGI program stores HTTP request parameters in a fixed area sized for 140 parameters. It never checked parameter size, and before Patch 2 never checked the count either. The exploit sends a 140th parameter that is too large, overrunning the area and overwriting the program's parameter counter. The next parameter then lands outside the buffer, letting the attacker swap the function the program is about to call for one that executes their command. Patch 2, released for CVE-2026-7273 on June 16, added a check on the counter — but the check runs only after the oversized parameter has already been copied, when the counter holds the attacker's value. Binarly reports the exploit works against Patch 2 without any changes. Zyxel's position, per Binarly: the June advisory covered the missing counter check, and the missing size check is a separate flaw now tracked as CVE-2026-107441. Patch 3 checks the counter before copying and limits the copy's size — which, per the researchers, finally fixes it.

The timeline is ugly. Attacks began around August 17, pulling switch configurations, hashed root credentials, and network information via a data-collection script staged for later pickup. Of the 996 compromised switches, 564 still ran factory-default credentials. CISA added CVE-2026-7273 to its KEV catalog on September 21 with a September 24 deadline — the same day GreyNoise's attack report went public — while the actual exploited flaw sat unlisted. Binarly found the working exploit on September 17 in an open folder on a server doubling as a command server for JITTERLY, a backdoor Acronis links to the Chinese-speaking Red Heron group, and reported the flaw to Zyxel on September 29. Patch 3 firmware was posted October 23; the vendor advisory followed on November 3. Binarly rates the flaw 9.8 against the vendor's 8.8, and neither GreyNoise, Binarly, nor Zyxel says whether the switches hit in August were even running the earlier fix. A smaller proof of concept is coming.

Zyxel's advisory describes a "LAN-based, unauthenticated attacker" reachable via a crafted HTTP request; Binarly bluntly notes the requirement is simply network reachability to the management service. All ten affected models — GS1900-8, -8HP, -10HP, -16, -24, -24E, -24EP, -24HPv2, -48, -48HPv2 — need the Patch 3 builds, and the advisory lists no workaround for owners who cannot update yet.

What Should You Do?

  1. Patch every GS1900 to Patch 3. Switches on Patch 2 or older firmware need the new 2.90(xxx.3)C0 build for their model, listed per-model in Zyxel's advisory.
  2. Assume "patched" meant nothing until now. If you applied the June Patch 2 and considered CVE-2026-7273 closed in September, your switch was still exploitable this whole time — re-verify, don't re-trust.
  3. Get management interfaces off the network edge. The exploit needs nothing but reachability to the web management service; restrict it to a management VLAN or trusted internal networks.
  4. Hunt and rotate. If the switch was internet-reachable since August: assume its configuration and hashed root credentials left the building. Change every credential — 564 of the compromised switches never bothered — and inspect configs, admin accounts, and firmware integrity.

The WAF Angle

This story is a controlled experiment in what "patched" is worth. The June fix passed the test "does the old exploit still crash it?" while the real attack chain — oversized parameter, counter overwrite, function-pointer swap — walked straight through, because the check was added on the wrong side of the copy. Web defenders see this shape constantly: the fix that blocks the PoC but not the bug, the WAF rule that matches the published exploit string but not the next encoder iteration. The second lesson is inventory integrity under pressure: CISA KEV'd CVE-2026-7273 with a three-day federal deadline while the actual exploited vulnerability — CVE-2026-107441 — remains unlisted, so KEV-driven patching programs closed the wrong door this autumn. Verify remediation against the root cause, not the advisory ID, the same discipline the Oracle EBS patch-gap attacks demanded, and the same caution we urged when the 996-switch campaign first hit the KEV list in September.

Sources