Ivanti Closes the Connect Secure Zero-Day Chain — CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 Get Fixes, a KEV Listing, and a Federal Deadline That Expires Today
Ivanti Closes the Connect Secure Zero-Day Chain — CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 Get Fixes, a KEV Listing, and a Federal Deadline That Expires Today
Ivanti has shipped patches for the last two zero-days in the Connect Secure (ICS) attack chain it disclosed in mid-October, closing a saga that saw attackers chain three flaws into unauthenticated root on a fully patched VPN appliance. The new fixes cover CVE-2026-111357, a CVSS 8.8 missing-authentication-for-critical-function bug that lets a local authenticated attacker escalate privileges, and CVE-2026-118527, a CVSS 4.3 predictable-identifier flaw that lets an authenticated attacker remotely upload files of their choosing to a disk location known in advance. CISA added both to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on October 30 — and federal agencies have until November 2, today, to remediate CVE-2026-111357 (the second CVE's deadline is November 13).
The two flaws were the missing pieces of the chain we covered when Volexity first exposed it: an attacker tracked as UTA0576 chained them with CVE-2026-104935, an authentication bypass patched on October 13, to run code as root on an appliance that was fully patched at the time. CVE-2026-111357 is in fact the privilege-escalation zero-day for which no fix existed when the attacks came to light — Ivanti says that when it discovered the exploitation, its CVE-2026-104935 fix was already in QA and it chose to ship that fix alone rather than delay, because it closed the main exploitation route. The affected releases are ICS 25.1.1.2 and prior and 22.8R2.5 and prior, fixed in 25.1.1.3 and 22.8R2.6. Ivanti's message to anyone who patched in October is blunt: those were the versions that fixed CVE-2026-104935, so "the latest release addresses all vulnerabilities which were chained and exploited in the wild" — you have to upgrade again.
Volexity assessed with high confidence that UTA0576's actions "signaled preparation for lateral movement and a broader compromise of the victim network," even though the operation was detected and disrupted before its ultimate objective surfaced; the firm still assesses with low confidence the actor is criminally rather than state motivated. Rapid7's incident data explains what that preparation looked like: the attackers stole credentials and queried Active Directory for Windows LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys — the exact material needed to move through a network quietly. Volexity saw the first exploitation signs on October 3, and threat firm Defused reported decoy hits it believes targeted CVE-2026-104935 starting October 1, before the flaw was public.
The uncomfortable part is detection. Rapid7 warns that the observed activity evades Ivanti's Integrity Checker Tool, so a clean ICT result does not rule out compromise — which makes the standard "patch and move on" reflex dangerous here. Volexity has published indicators of compromise and YARA rules for the campaign, and CISA's directive orders agencies to patch, then engage in forensic triage for signs of compromise rather than assume the appliance is clean.
What Should You Do?
- Upgrade to 25.1.1.3 or 22.8R2.6 now — if you installed 25.1.1.2 or 22.8R2.5 in response to the October 13 advisory, you are still vulnerable to the privilege-escalation and file-upload legs of the chain and must patch again.
- Treat the box as suspect, not clean — the observed activity evades Ivanti's Integrity Checker Tool, so hunt for compromise instead of trusting a clean scan: preserve memory and logs before any reboot or reset, and follow Ivanti's recovery steps.
- Hunt for the specific post-exploitation moves — review Active Directory for anomalous LAPS password reads and BitLocker recovery key queries, unusual credential use, and log tampering; Volexity's IoCs and YARA rules cover the campaign.
- Rotate every credential the appliance touched — VPN-held domain credentials, service accounts, and anything cached on the box should be considered exposed even if scans come back clean.
The WAF Angle
This is the third chapter in a month-long lesson that the VPN concentrator is now the most-attacked edge device in the enterprise stack — the same pattern we tracked in the original Volexity disclosure of the three-flaw chain, in Cisco's exploited ASA/FTD SSL VPN zero-day, and in ransomware crews camping inside a patched Palo Alto GlobalProtect flaw. None of that traffic crosses a WAF: the SSL VPN service is its own internet-facing endpoint with its own auth logic and its own parser surface. What transfers from web-security practice is the mindset — assume the edge authentication device itself is attacker-reachable, monitor its logs as aggressively as you monitor your web estate, and treat "patched" as a floor rather than a verdict. The ICT-evasion detail is the sharpest reminder: integrity checks on the appliance are a control, not a guarantee, and post-patch forensic triage is part of remediation, not an optional extra.