Second Wave of Fridge Attacks Sweeps European Supermarkets — More Than 115 Stores From Belgium to Estonia Woke Up to 50°C Freezers and, in Some Cases, Fire

Second Wave of Fridge Attacks Sweeps European Supermarkets — More Than 115 Stores From Belgium to Estonia Woke Up to 50°C Freezers and, in Some Cases, Fire

Second Wave of Fridge Attacks Sweeps European Supermarkets — More Than 115 Stores From Belgium to Estonia Woke Up to 50°C Freezers and, in Some Cases, Fire

Overnight into Monday, November 2, hackers disrupted refrigeration systems at supermarkets across Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Luxembourg, Ireland, and Estonia, remotely changing temperature settings on freezers and cooling systems in more than 115 stores. In some cases the attackers shut refrigerators down or triggered defrost cycles, letting temperatures climb and forcing store staff to intervene early in the morning to save what stock they could. BleepingComputer confirmed the failures with spokespeople for multiple chains; the pattern is the second such wave in three weeks, after the mid-October attacks that hit hundreds of French supermarkets.

The acknowledged damage map is unusually specific for an ongoing incident: Ahold Delhaize reported around 40 affected locations in Belgium and Luxembourg, Carrefour 15 in Belgium, Intermarché around 15, Spar Colruyt 5, ICA at least 4 stores in Sweden (its Kvantum store in Sjöbo publicly blamed a cyberattack after fridge and freezer temperatures rose to 50°C, and the ICA Hägerstensåsen store in Stockholm was also affected), Coop 7 confirmed in Sweden, SuperValu 13 stores in Ireland, Selver one store in Estonia, and at least 17 butcher shops and neighborhood stores in the Netherlands — plus an Ikea superstore in Mons, grocery stores, and chocolate shops in Belgium. ICA Group press officer Gustaf Nilsson told TT: "We are aware that a limited number of stores were affected by an incident overnight that affected their refrigeration and freezer systems. Ica is providing support in handling the incident."

The mechanics match the French wave in every detail that matters. Attackers reached refrigeration controllers through their remote management paths and set temperatures to around 50°C — with forced defrost engaged continuously — so equipment heated for hours instead of keeping goods cold; a sector source described "a wave of heat" when staff opened the doors in the morning. And the outcome is escalating: cybersecurity consultant Emil Olofsson of Integrity 360 told Swedish news agency TT that temperatures reached 80°C in some cases and several units caught fire — a figure that differs from the one police have reported. It remains unclear whether the dozens of stores were hit in a coordinated campaign or targeted individually, but the geographic spread overnight suggests whoever is behind it did not need to be picky about vendor or country.

The French attacks targeted equipment from the Danish maker Danfoss whose management interfaces are exposed online — most of it end-of-life, with no patch coming — in a campaign we covered when ANSSI's alert expanded it to Copeland and Dixell controllers. Whether this wave uses the same entry path will come from the ongoing investigations, but the lesson from October already generalizes: the attack surface is not the refrigerator — it is the remote monitoring portal, the vendor cloud account, or the exposed management interface behind it, and a food retailer's cold chain has all three.

What Should You Do?

  1. Treat refrigeration and building-management controllers as IT infrastructure — inventory every device that can change temperature settings remotely, including its vendor cloud account, portal, and management interface exposure.
  2. Isolate the OT network from the store network — refrigeration controllers should not share a flat network with POS and staff Wi-Fi; segmentation is what turns one compromised till into a contained incident instead of a lost cold chain.
  3. Lock down remote access paths — enforce MFA on vendor portals and remote-management accounts, remove standing access for external maintenance crews, and take end-of-life controllers off the internet entirely; if the vendor is gone, the interface should be too.
  4. Watch for the attack signature, not the breach — alert on out-of-policy temperature or defrost commands, off-hours configuration changes, and controller logins from unusual sources; the first detection signal in these incidents was 50°C freezers, which is far too late.

The WAF Angle

Nothing about this campaign crosses a web application firewall, and everything about it rhymes with the web-security stories we cover. The entry point is the same one in every e-commerce and CMS compromise we have written up this year — a management endpoint or vendor portal that nobody segmented, monitored, or inventoried — except the payload is a temperature instead of a webshell. The French wave reached controllers through exposed management interfaces on end-of-life hardware, the same "unsupported version, internet-facing, no patch coming" profile that makes old CMS installs dangerous. And the operational lesson transfers exactly: the controls that would have caught this — MFA on the portal, network segmentation, anomaly alerts on configuration changes — are the OT twins of the route-aware and behavioral checks we push for web estates. Attackers stopped needing to breach the store's network when they realized the equipment behind the store ships with its own credentials, its own portal, and nobody watching. Your attack surface is every internet-connected thing your business depends on, and that list now includes the freezers.

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